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Abstract 
This paper analyses the interplay of transport and development in North Korea, one of the 
most state-controlled and underdeveloped countries of the world. While broader aspects have 
been well described by various studies, logistics have been given little attention as permissive 
or restrictive factors in the country‟s development. Despite the recent reforms and the growth 
of trade, the development of North Korea is confronted to the weaknesses of the transport 
system and inland logistics. An analysis of vessel movements at North Korean ports (1985-
2006) shows that although coastal economies may increasingly use maritime transport to 
overcome inland blockages, the evolution of port traffics better reflects broader trends such as 
general economic decline, westward shift of populations, and the polarization of economic 
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activities around Pyongyang area. Beside those trends, the research also estimates the 
importance of maritime transport in North Korean trade and it provides a base upon which 
further studies can be conducted, so as to better evaluate the place of North Korea among 
transport studies.  
Keywords: DPRK, North Korea, Port city, Socialist Developing Country, Transition 
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1. Introduction 
Following the crisis of the 1990s, provoked by the collapse of socialist countries and 
accentuated by natural disasters, Kim Jeong Il‟s military-oriented government has favoured a 
number of measures for the Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea (DPRK, hereafter North 
Korea)‟s economic and social improvement. This radical break from the country‟s past 
attitude toward the outside world is based on institutional reforms, territorial management and 
increased relationships with other countries. Moreover, the ongoing changes are making 
transportation and logistics breathtakingly important, given the strategic location of North 
Korea within Northeast Asia and its potential for the processing and exportation of both raw 
material and manufactured goods. Its emerging status as a “transition” economy thus allows 
comparison to the role of ports and transport activities in such countries (Ledger and Roe, 
1996; Thorez, 1998a; Jauernig and Roe, 2000 and 2001; Brodin, 2000). Notably, it is 
interesting to analyse the North Korean case because of its original identity, between 
developing and socialist countries, in terms of territorial planning and ideological constraints 
(Jo and Adler, 2002a).  
Although transportation issues have been analysed in the case of transition countries and 
developing countries, it has never been confronted with the specific case of North Korea, a 
socialist developing country. Its proximity to major markets like China, South Korea, Japan 
and Russia gives to North Korea a particular advantage compared to other socialist 
developing countries like Vietnam and Cuba. Port studies have been „few and dated‟ outside 
developed countries (Airriess, 1989), whereas „the role of seaports - and indeed of transport 
facilities in general - as economic enablers and sometimes as stimuli to development is 
frequently underestimated‟ (Hoyle and Hilling, 1984). Although North Korea is still far from 
reaching the development stages of new port construction in Thailand (Robinson, 1981) or the 
problem related to industrial, port and urban concentration in Africa (Hoyle, 1981), it offers 
 4 
an original case for studying the political factors influencing port development as seen in the 
Polish (Taylor, 1984) and Baltic (Brodin, 2003) cases. Given the limited information about 
North Korea, this paper adopts a broader view on the links between transport and 
development in a socialist developing country by refining a number of dispersed information 
which help to understand the importance of transport among - and in relation with - other 
issues. The level and nature of port activities are a good indicator of the evolution of the 
related hinterlands. Thus in this paper, ports in North Korea are seen as windows on internal 
and external changes rather than enablers of economic development.  
One may argue that studying transport and development in an isolated and declining 
country might not bring anything new to port studies; however, the study of ports in North 
Korea is based on several arguments. Despite the militarist and unstable attitude of the North 
Korean regime, foreign investment is growing in North Korea, notably after the reforms. 
Also, two maritime façades, eight international trading ports in such a small country, and the 
coastal location of most large cities are advantages in favouring economies of scale for 
industries. Such argument is also founded on the logistic constraints in moving goods inland. 
Energy shortages and the dereliction of road and railway infrastructures result in cost and 
delays for connecting the urban system. Furthermore, it is believed that coastal cities are 
differently confronted to the country‟s difficulties.  
The first section introduces the methodological problems of the research and the main data 
sources for studying transport issues in North Korea. The second section offers a descriptive 
explanation of the recent changes in one of the world‟s less known countries, in terms of 
economic reforms, territorial management, trade evolution and industrial development, by 
using updated data from the most reliable organisations. The third section reviews the 
different sources for analysing the North Korean transport system as a means to acknowledge 
the scarcity of data about ports and maritime transportation, and provides an overview of 
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logistics issues. The fourth section analyses the main trends in the evolution of North Korean 
maritime transportation (1985-2005), and develops the comparison between the traditional 
port-city functions of coastal cities and the evolution of vessel movements. Finally, 
concluding remarks are given about the relation between institutional reform, technical 
constraint and transport development in North Korea, for a contribution to the study of ports 
and logistics as permissive or restricting factors in development (Hoyle, 1974).  
 
2. Methodological issues 
Throughout the literature about North Korea, transport-related issues have not yet been 
consistently developed. Moreover, port-related issues in North Korea are not a core subject, 
because most works deal with land transport and the connection of North Korea to continental 
networks (e.g., estimations of freight flows by train), except for the Rajin-Seonbong Free-
Trade Zone experiment. Although regular announcements can be found in the press about the 
development of North Korean ports, most projects cannot be verified because of the high level 
of protectionism since the army controls ports in North Korea.  
Thus, this research proposes an overview of the economic situation of the country by 
synthesising a large part of the existing English-based literature, dispersed through research 
reports, governmental papers, worldwide directories, newspapers, professional websites, and 
working papers from various countries and scholars. Korean sources include publications 
from the South Korean Ministry of Unification, the Bank of Korea, and the Korea Trade 
Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA). Non-Korean organizations or researchers, willing 
to provide estimates about this unknown country in general, provide all other sources. In all 
cases, figures should be used with caution, as no data comes directly from North Korea itself, 
and one may even doubt the capacity of the North Korean regime to furnish any coherent 
information about the country.  
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Sea transport statistics on North Korea are limited to the yearly figures of the International 
Road Transport Union available until 1990 (IRU, 1996), and the estimations and forecasts of 
the Korea Maritime Institute until 2020 (Kim et al., 1998) on a national scale. The South 
Korean Ministry of Unification provides some port-based statistics, but it is limited to inter-
Korean shipments. The main source used in this paper allows overcoming such limitations, 
and it has the advantage of coming from an independent and reliable organisation. Although 
such data cannot indicate the real amount of cargo loaded and unloaded at the ports, it 
provides the possibility to compare their activity in terms of ship capacity, along a period of 
20 years. Furthermore, it helps to avoid relying on mismatched estimations from published 
statistics. 
The database on vessel movements provides information about the daily arrival and 
departure of trading vessels above 100 Gross Registered Tons (GRT) together with their 
Deadweight Tonnage (DWT), container capacity, year of construction, flag, ship owner, 
origin and destination by foreign port, and many others. The type of ships can be used as a 
surrogate for the nature of the goods transported. Given the cost of shipping to this country, 
one can acknowledge that most ships have not been empty when calling at North Korean 
ports. Another very important argument in favour of this source is that it allows bypassing the 
army itself for accessing local-based data related to ports. Of course, the data has also 
important lacks such as the difficulty to: 
- distinguish commercial flows and humanitarian aids; 
- get a more detailed measure of “bulk” and “general cargo”, which represent more than 
80% of cargoes on an average basis, with the other cargoes divided between cement, 
chemical, container, fish products, reefer, ro-ro, tanker, vehicles, and wood; 
- separate import and exports, as the same ships come and go without indicating the 
amount of cargo loaded and unloaded.  
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3. Changes in North Korea 
3.1 Economic reforms and territorial management 
In July 2002, reform measures were launched for the entire economy, following the June 
15 Joint Declaration with South Korea in 2000 and the announcement of the „new way of 
thinking‟ in January 2001. It aimed at adjusting consumer prices, wages and foreign exchange 
rates, together with expanding the autonomy of businesses to increase flexibility and 
productivity. Despite its former negative connotation, the concept of market is officially 
recognized since March 2003 as part of the „practical socialism‟ inspired by the Chinese 
model. This was made possible by a gradual empowerment of the cabinet at the expense of 
the party‟s influence. This led to the development of commercial distribution, with an increase 
in general markets, and shops and stores managed individually and advertised through 
trademark signs in public places (e.g. Pyeonghwa Automobiles). Factories, farms and private 
businesses were given greater decision power to buy land and raw materials, to receive loans 
from banks instead from the state, to hire employees, to profit from the selling of surplus 
products, and to invest in labour welfare or the facility improvement.  
A major planning instrument to open DPRK to the outside world and increase its profits is 
the free-trade zones and the reorganization of administrative units. Following the Joint 
Venture Law in 1984, the first Special Economic and Trade Zone was launched in 1991. This 
act covered the city of Rajin and the district of Seonbong (746 km²), part of the wider Tumen 
River Economic Zone, a border region with China and Russia created for enhancing the 
logistic, port and industrial advantages of the area, named Raseon since 2000. The 
development of Rajin-Seonbong has often been constrained by its remoteness and by the lack 
of transparency of its management following its creation (Jung et al., 2003). However, with 
recent Chinese investment, the interest in the region has been growing. Though the Raseon 
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Special Economic and Trade Zone had not been successful due to accessibility problem, 
recent Chinese effort to expand port activity in the Pacific Area has been making this special 
zone prospective in development. 
These three major achievements were made in 2002: the city of Sinuiju with around 50 
surrounding local units was designated a Special Administrative Region under the control of 
the central authority; the Mount Geumgang was chosen as a Tourism District in Gangwon 
province; and the Gaeseong Industrial District was created close to the ancient capital of the 
Goryeo Kingdom. Discussions are in progress about the designation of Nampo port and the 
outlying Wawoo district as a Special District. The Special Administrative Region of Sinuiju, 
bordering the Chinese city of Dandong along the Amrok River, is a strategic path through 
which almost 80% of North Korean exports pass. Its major focus is to reconvert its industrial 
facilities within a multifunctional district of 130 km². Though it was not successfully launched 
due to subtle diplomatic difference between China and North Korea, growing Chinese 
interests tend to enlarge outer recognition of this region. Chinese government expects some 
positive effects on Liaoning province while supporting the project with energy. As in Rajin-
Seonbong, the lack of an inland connection from the zone to the capital city has been a major 
obstacle.  
Two other specialized zones concern the specific relationships with South Korea. South 
Korean players pursuing balanced growth between the two countries and hoping for eventual 
reunification mostly financed these. The International Tourism Free Zone of Geumgang 
mountain has been linked since 1999 by a maritime route from Donghae port, which is 
scheduled to become a Free Economic Zone. After success attracting South Korean visitors 
(from 12 000 in 1998 to more than 1.2 million in 2005), the area has been inserted in a wider 
project opening more mountain area and expanding the zone to the northern Wonsan city. The 
Gaeseong Industrial Complex, located at 160 km south of Pyongyang in North Korea and 60 
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km north of Seoul in South Korea, has been developed near the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). It 
covers 24.5 km² among the forecasted 65 km², which shall include a new town of 6.47 km² 
between 2007 and 2012. A qualified and cheap workforce (US$57.5 a month against US$449 
in South Korea in 2003) is the main attraction for companies, which are mainly Korean. 
However, the United States‟ embargo on DPRK, through the Wassenaar Agreement (1996), 
restrains exports in general and controls the importation of technological products. As a 
consequence, most products made in Gaeseong are sent to South Korea before completion and 
are registered as South Korean products before being exported. 
 
3.2 Geographic and economic situation 
With a population of 23 million, North Korea has approximately half the population of 
South Korea on a slightly larger but more mountainous surface. The population concentrates 
mostly along the east and west coasts (see Figure 1), especially Pyongyang city and South 
Pyeongan province, which have been the most dynamic in the recent years, questioning the 
ideology of balanced regional development in a socialist country (Jo and Adler, 2002b).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE: Population evolution] 
 
Industrial activities were sustained until North Korea could no longer rely on its 
neighbours for energy supplies, especially after the collapse of the socialist block (1989-
1991). Thus, the end of former informal agreements had immediate consequences on the 
overall economy, as North Korea did not have enough capital to buy energy instead of 
exchanging it against other products. Mining, farming and transporting declined rapidly, 
leading the country to starvation, general crisis and stagnation. The other factor causing 
difficulty for North Korea was its substantial investments in defence and the heavy industry, 
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which were not competitive in the age of globalisation marked by light industry and tertiary 
activities (Jo and Adler, 2002b).  
The evolution of the North Korean economic structure reveals two distinct stages: the rise 
of mining and manufacturing sectors, which were up to 60% of the GDP at the expense of 
agriculture and services, and then the rapid decline of industrial activities from 60% to 26% 
around 2001 in favour of services (43.6%) and agriculture (30.4%) (Ahn, 2003). The growth 
of the service sector can be attributed to the increased role of the army in the economy, and to 
its construction projects related to hydro power plants, housing and highways.  
Outside free trade zones and specialized zones, two other locations are of prime concern 
for economic development: the Nampo-Pyongyang corridor for manufacturing activities, and 
the northeastern coastal area for mining and raw material exports. The Daean Friendship 
Glass Factory opened in 2006 as a Chinese investment in the Nampo area of US$24 million. 
The Nampo-Pyongyang corridor has received increased recognition from foreign players 
(Korea Times, 2000), because of its connection to DPRK‟s unique international airport and its 
10-lanes highway.  
Recently, major projects have been launched to restart the extraction of raw materials in 
DPRK. In Danchon, the world‟s third largest magnesite mine, a French company has obtained 
permission to mine for 50 years in exchange of providing hydro power plants to North Korea. 
The Korea Resources Corporation (KORES) and a North Korean company have also 
launched a joint-venture in Jeongchon, to exploit 1,830 tons of graphite a year, covering 20% 
of South Korea‟s needs. Rajin port is being leased to China for 50 years, together with the 
improvement of the highway link to the Chinese city of Hunchen and the creation of a 
logistics free zone in Namyang, Onsong County, at the border along the Tumen River. It aims 
at developing trade with the Chinese Jilin province and at fostering relationships between 
Japanese, South Korean companies seeking to establish manufacturing export plants in the 
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area, and Chinese companies located in the neighbouring cities (Hankyoreh, 2006).  
According to UNCTAD estimates, North Korea‟s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock 
increased from US$572 in 1990 to US$1,022 in 2003, representing 3% and 10% of national 
GNP respectively. This points to an increasing trend, but the amounts remain small. On one 
side, it can be argued that the low level of inward FDIs in North Korea is caused by its 
unattractive environment and by the failure of its government „to convince the international 
business community regarding its economic reform policy‟ (Lee, 2005). On the other side, 
according to Chabaud-Latour (2006), who manages the sole European consulting company 
registered in North Korea since 2001 involved in logistics, confection, energy and automobile 
parts, the very well educated and skilled manpower offers a considerable advantage over other 
Asian countries, even China. North Korea‟s decision to use the Euro as its foreign currency is 
definitely a political gesture against the U.S., but it also signifies the potential investment of 
European companies in North Korea as no historical or geopolitical issue is involved 
(Bridges, 2003). 
 
3.3 Foreign trade 
The foreign trade of North Korea has evolved through two major trends between 1990 and 
2005. The first important trend is the distinction between a period of declining and unstable 
trade (1990-1998) and a period of stable growth (1998-2005). The second important trend is 
that, whatever the general evolution of foreign trade, the share of inter-Korean trade is 
constantly growing (Table 1). Overall foreign trade is known to be chronically in deficit as 
imports surpass exports.  
The growth of north-south trade must not hide the more important increase of trade with 
China. Trade between the two nations has almost doubled between 2001 and 2005, and 
according to the Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), 120 Chinese 
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companies have already invested in North Korea, representing around US$ 150 millions and 
48% of North Korean exports (Pons, 2005). The modest but rapidly growing trade with 
Russia and Thailand has almost tripled in the same period, reflecting North Korea‟s 
increasing dependence on imported food and energy. In contrast, trade with Japan has 
dramatically decreased due to worsening diplomatic relations.  
Also, north-south trade growth is hiding different realities, including the importance of 
humanitarian shipments which constitute between 25% and 60% of the products exported 
from south to north since 1998 (Table 2). In general, non-commercial exports make up a 
significant portion of the exports from south to north, of which the different cooperation 
projects (e.g. Mount Geumgang) and the material aid are major components. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE: Trade by main partners] 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE: Trade between North Korea and South Korea] 
 
General commercial exports to the north concern machinery and transport equipment, 
textile and chemical products through a regular larger share (more than 60%), and exports 
related to processing trade are dominated by textile, electric and electronic products (80% to 
90%). Imports from north to south are increasing regularly in quantity, notably after 2002. 
These are mainly textile, metal and agricultural products for general imports and textile 
products for imports related to processing trade.  
 
4. The North Korean transport system 
4.1 Logistics and inland transportation 
Transport infrastructures in North Korea are unsurprisingly less developed than its 
neighbours in terms of road network, airports and merchant fleet, but the railway network is 
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highly electrified (Table 3). This reflects the effects of the Japanese occupation (1910-1945), 
and the strategy of developing a „fully integrated and containerised transport system‟ (Ahn, 
2003) centred on inland transportation, with a priority given to railways as in the Russian 
model (90%). The modal split in North Korea is distributed among railways (73.8%), roads 
(18.3%), sea (7.9%) in 1989 (Tsuji, 2000), what is confirmed by recent estimates with 
railways (70%) roads (17%), sea (10%) and air (3%) in 2005 (Roussin and Ducruet, 2006). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE: Transport infrastructures] 
 
Despite their importance, railways have been highly struck by the economic crisis that 
started to spread in every sector of DPRK in the 1970s. The lack of energy has forced using 
old Japanese steam trains fuelled with second-hand tires. Despite the abundance of coal in the 
country, it is now estimated that 70% of the entire power generation facilities are either 
abandoned or need urgent repairs, while 20% only of all factories are said to keep some 
activities (Ministry of Unification in South Korea, 2006).  
Another consequence of isolation and energy shortages is the low road pavement rate of 
7% (Bang, 2004). This also reflects the governmental restriction and military control of 
circulation within the country, notably for Pyongyang where a special permit is required to 
enter. As a result, the time-distance by truck from Pyongyang to main cities is unrealistic and 
constantly increasing (Table 4), and truck drivers tend to avoid a voyage to the Northeast 
where several accidents have been reported (Cotton, 1996).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE: Time and distance from Pyongyang to main cities] 
 
The regional distribution of domestic transport activity shows a strong unbalance and 
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relative disconnection between the western area, which occupies 40% of the total (30% in 
South Pyongan, 10% in North Pyongan), and the eastern area, accounting for 41% of the total 
(24% in North Hamgyeong, 17% in South Hamgyeong) (Tsuji, 2005). Thus, South and North 
Korean companies involved in processing trade have to spend 40% of their manufacturing 
costs on logistics. 
 
4.2 Ports and maritime transportation 
Because the army controls North Korean ports, it is impossible to verify the published 
statistics on port infrastructures. Different estimations collected from various sources are not 
well matched (Table 5), notably for Cheongjin and Wonsan which show very contrasting 
profiles in terms of quay length and nautical depth.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE: Port infrastructures] 
 
Although maritime transport was destined „to ensure coastal transport, expand railway 
connections and, in particular, improve foreign trade using ships‟ (Ahn, 2003) by the 1961 7-
year Development Plan of North Korea, it has remained very limited as it is the case of former 
Soviet countries (Thorez, 1998b). Due to economic decline and isolation, port facilities have 
stagnated except for some investment in oil berths in the 1970s and storage facilities in the 
1980s.  
Nowadays, several sources indicate institutional and technical barriers affecting shipping, 
excessive logistics costs, and prolonged shipping time (Ahn, 2002). Still, the Incheon-Nampo 
round trip takes 24 hours for 100km, and it costs as much as the route to Europe: US$1,000 to 
transport for one TEU (Ahn, 2001). Furthermore, ports collect exorbitant port-entry fees, 
making the cost three times higher than for connecting Tianjin in China. Especially, 45% of 
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containers sent to North Korea return empty (Forster-Carter, 2001). Despite the failure of 
South Korean investments in new port facilities around Nampo (Yonhap News, 2005), 
following the strategy announced by Korea Container Terminal Authority (Lloyd‟s Register, 
2005), a new container terminal has opened in 2006 (Lloyd‟s Register, 2006). This terminal is 
seen as a complement to the general cargo quay of Songgwan port built in 2001 closer to the 
West Sea Barrage (Jo and Ducruet, 2006). Although no specific facilities for handling 
containers are said to exist in North Korea (Kim, 2005), the Incheon-Nampo line carries most 
of inter-Korean containerised shipments (Korea Times, 2001; Ahn, 2002), notably with the 
South Korean company Kook Yang Shipping and the Trade of Fortune, sponsored by the 
South Korean Ministry of Unification through the Maritime Agreement signed in 2005 
between the two countries.  
 
4.3 North Korean border trade in the Northeast Asian transport system 
The prospects for improving logistics at the borders reflect the strategies of North Korea‟s 
neighbours (Figure 3). China plans a six lane 67km highway construction to connect Hunchen 
city, China and the Raseon Free-Trade Zone, as well as a dedicated terminal in Rajin. This 
would allow a shorter path for exporting Chinese manufactured goods to Japan and the 
Pacific. The strategy for the Raseon area is to attract Chinese trade by offering lower costs, 
enabling shipments to bypass the Yellow Sea and the Russian ports, which are frozen during 
winter and have lower capacity (Vladivostok, Vostochny, Nakhodka, Posyet and Zarubino). 
For Japan, the plan is for a direct maritime connection to the Trans-Siberia-Railroad (TSR) 
and the Trans-China-Railroad (TCR) transport system, given the recent rejection of the South 
Korean government to connect Busan, South Korea and Tsushima, Japan by a submarine 
tunnel. China also plans a second bridge to Sinuiju, a railway connection and the so-called 
green road which, in the future, could connect to the core region of Pyongyang and use the 
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Amrok River (Yalu in Chinese) for barging to and from the border cities of Sinuiju, Dandong 
and the small island.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE: Development projects in North Korea] 
 
South Korea seeks long-term interaction based on mutual benefits, but the scope of its 
projects in the North, apart from Gaeseong and Geumgang, are still limited because of 
politics. To strengthen regional cooperation, the South Korean government has proposed to 
make better use of the Han River, as a common resource for sand and barging, and of the 
Yaeseong River, to enable more direct exports from the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. Still, 
the demilitarised zone (DMZ) is a constraint and the inter-Korean railway has yet to be 
reconnected, but recent cancellation of the joint rail test-runs by North Korea reveals the 
unstable cooperation taking place between the two Koreas (Ministry of Unification in South 
Korea, 2006).  
 
5. Maritime transport and the economy 
5.1 General trends and economic weight 
When comparing total trade and total shipping capacity (Figure 3), it is interesting to see 
that maritime activity has maintained in times of trade decline, notably from the mid-1990s to 
the early 2000s. This is better seen when estimating the share of sea trade in total trade 
(Figure 4). One ratio (a) is based on US$250 per DWT, retained from the average ton-dollar 
values of Japanese and South Korean trade with North Korea, which occur dominantly by sea, 
and have been applied to total North Korean maritime traffic. Another ratio (b) distinguishes 
different types of traffics including container & roll-on roll-off, general cargo, solid bulks, 
chemicals, and liquid bulks. It applies the reducing coefficient proposed by Charlier (1994) to 
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obtain „weighted tons‟ as a more realistic measure of the value of cargoes. Weighted tons are 
then transferred to dollars with the same value of US$250. As a result, the two ratios give a 
very different importance to sea trade, with average shares of 26.7% for ratio (a) and 15.2% 
for ratio (b) along the period. In both cases, the importance of sea trade is higher than 
previous estimations - the intermediate share is likely to oscillate around 20% - but it varies 
over time. The different periods affecting the importance of sea trade can be distinguished as 
follows:  
- the contraction of forelands stemming from the disconnection from the world system 
and the sudden ceasing of trade relationships with socialist countries (1985-1991); 
- the effect of the construction and operation of the Rajin-Seonbong Free-Trade Zone 
experiment (1991-1993), for which maritime transport has been necessary to carry 
goods to the remote location; 
- the continuous relationship with Japan and growing humanitarian aids (1994-2001) at 
a time of isolation, famine, and reinforced militarist government after the death of 
former president Kim Il-Sung; 
- the effects of inter-Korean cooperation projects after the summit, and the increased 
trade with China (2002-2005), for which trade relationships are mostly continental and 
result in border trade through Sinuiju and the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ).  
 
5.2 Evolution of the port system 
The relative share of North Korean ports is a good indicator of the evolution of the whole 
economy (Figure 5). It clearly shows the shift of main port activities from the East to the West 
coast as a result of combined factors such as declining trade with Japan, growing isolation and 
economic decline of Eastern coastal cities, the increased primacy of the Pyongyang core 
region, and the emergence of the Pyongyang-Nampo corridor as the only area where 
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industries keep a regular activity, benefiting from the highway network and the international 
airport. For the biggest eastern cities such as Cheongjin and Heungnam-Hamheung, one must 
not forget the importance of aids in the revival of their port activity, from 1999. The 
continued activity of Wonsan until 1998 can be attributed to the regular ferry link with 
Niigata, Japan. Since 2002, several issues have been regularly reported by Japanese 
authorities. These issues are drug trafficking, passenger safety and overloading, technical 
problems (e.g., lack of evacuation route signs, radio communication, and engine room fire 
extinguisher), oil spills, spying, and transfer of illegal money and nuclear weapons 
components. This has resulted in the banning of North Korean ships from Japanese ports 
(Lloyd‟s Register, 2002).  
Compared to Taaffe et al.‟s (1963) model that is defined by the concentration on one main 
port at the expense of smaller and peripheral ports in underdeveloped countries, we have in 
North Korea another phenomenon. The disconnection of landside relationship between port 
cities and the existence of two maritime facades enjoying privileged relationships with 
neighbouring trading partners is reducing the formation of a unique and dominant load centre 
which would concentrate the flows in order to serve the country‟s primate city. Notably, 
Nampo‟s share of total shipments by sea has exceeded 50% only in 1997, 1998, 2003 and 
2004, remaining around 30 or 40% for most of the last two decades. One explanation of the 
restart of port activities in smaller ports such as Haeju and Songjin may be the increased 
inland logistic barrier, as previously unused ports start to serve for transportation, either for 
commercial flows or aid imports. For Haeju, the current growth could also reflect recent 
barging activity with Incheon since 2004. But despite its proximity to Gaeseong Industrial 
Complex, there is no reported activity between the two areas because of poor road connection. 
The recent growth of Rajin, though it remains very modest, may also illustrate the impact of 
Chinese transit trade.  
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Although this analysis shows partly the interplay of transport and development in North 
Korea through the evolution of vessel movements by port, a qualitative approach of the nature 
of the goods transported is needed. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE: Evolution of the port system] 
 
5.3 Maritime trade and port city specialization 
Given the irregularity of North Korean maritime activity based on tramping, the total 
vessel capacity by port has been distributed among three periods of seven years. Those 
periods correspond to important changes such as the collapse of the socialist block and the 
reforms, which have significantly affected the entire economy. As a base for analysing port 
activities, a synthesis of port and urban functions is provided (Table 6). It shows the 
traditional activities of the main port cities and the resources located in their close hinterland. 
As most cities tend to become isolated from each other because of logistic costs stemming 
from inland transport dereliction, it is believed that some factories maintain their activity in 
relation to their ports. Table 7 provides a synthesis of the vessel movements by type of ship 
and total capacity by North Korean port among the three periods.  
The seafood processing and fish industry is probably one of the most stable in North 
Korea. This is because it does not necessitate large amounts of energy and is surrounded by a 
large consumer market consisting of Japan and South Korea. For most cities specialized in 
this activity (Haeju, Nampo, Rajin, Wonsan), the vessel traffic of fish products and 
refrigerated containers (reefer) is stable or increasing in recent years, except for Cheongjin 
and Heungnam where this was not specified as a core activity.  
Two other sectors show a good number of coincidences. For chemical products, the 
distribution of vessel traffics echoes the specialization of four cities except Haeju, with a 
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recent growth in Cheongjin and Heungnam-Hamheung, and a regular decline in Nampo and 
Wonsan. For machinery, the traffic of vehicles matches the specialization of Cheongjin, 
Heungnam-Hamheung, Nampo (Pyonghwa Automobiles), except from Wonsan. This traffic 
might also represent the imports of second-hand cars from Japan rather than the local 
industry. Finally, wood traffics coincides with the specialization of Heungnam-Hamheung, 
and Wonsan welcomes the majority of ro-ro and passenger traffics. Another interesting trend 
is that most cement traffics occur at the biggest cities (Cheongjin, Heungnam-Hamheung, and 
Nampo), reflecting the trend of construction, but not in Haeju where a cement factory is 
reported to exist, or Wonsan, which is supposed to handle cement flows. For oil and other 
liquids, the largest amounts in the first period well reflect the importance of Wonsan and 
Heungnam‟s petrochemical industries, but this traffic has been dramatically reduced and 
redistributed to Nampo and Cheongjin, the main markets (including Pyongyang).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE: Port-urban specialization of coastal cities] 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE: Distribution of traffics by type of ships, port & period] 
 
The two remaining categories can be distinguished according to their broad function, with 
bulks serving more heavy industries and construction, while general cargoes are better 
represented for the local consumer market and light industries. Although this distinction is 
obviously not perfect, it can help to assess the relative evolution of urban economies. As seen 
in Table 8, both traffics indicate the dramatic decline of the eastern cities. While Wonsan and 
Heungnam show a regular loss of traffics, Cheongjin and Rajin have increased their bulk 
traffics during the first period, probably because of their strategic situation between Japan and 
China. For Rajin, the growth is better explained by the import of primary products and 
construction materials for the preparation of the Rajin-Seonbong free-trade zone. Haeju and 
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Songjin enjoy the highest growth rates, notably for general cargo, but the volumes remain 
small. At the end, Nampo is the only major port to maintain its activity along the period, with 
the lowest decline, thanks to its proximity to North Korea‟s largest industrial complex and 
primate city. General cargoes have dropped more rapidly than bulks, showing the specific 
tendency of the North Korean regime to support heavy rather than light industries. This global 
snapshot of the situation clearly indicates which coastal cities have been more struck by the 
economic collapse and isolation.  
 
 [INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE: Growth rates of bulk and general cargo traffics by port]] 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has proposed an analysis of cargo vessel movements at North Korean ports to 
evaluate the current situation of coastal urban economies and the effects of broader changes 
such as economic decline, isolation, economic reforms, and inland logistics dereliction on port 
activities. On one side, the activity of North Korean ports confirms the evolution of local 
industries, as their specialization is visible concerning minor traffics such as chemicals, 
vehicles, fish products, and oil products. On the other side, main traffics of bulk and general 
cargo are all reducing, reflecting the trend of economic decline throughout the country. 
However, coastal cities are responding differently to change. Smaller and peripheral ports 
such as Haeju and Songjin have seen their recent traffics growing rapidly, while Nampo, the 
port of Pyongyang, has the lowest decline and concentrates most of investments and traffics.  
Given the difficulties of land transport, the application of a Chinese model of port 
development in North Korea could appear as one solution for upgrading coastal industries. 
However, this strategy is not yet adopted for a number of reasons. First, the inland location of 
main industrial areas (Pyongyang, Gaeseong) and the dereliction of eastern cities hamper the 
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establishment of new industrial zones around port areas. Second, the current state of port 
infrastructures in North Korea and the distance to already existing foreign load centres such as 
Incheon, Busan, and Dalian, do not allow the replication of the Chinese model. In fact, the 
proximity of Hong Kong for spreading container technology and upgrading neighbouring 
Shenzhen ports has been crucial (Song, 2002). Since the Open Door Policy in 1978 followed 
by the creation of Special Economic Zones on coastal areas, Chinese industries have not been 
able to bypass Hong Kong for connecting directly global regular shipping lines through 
domestic ports until 1995 (Wang, 1998). Even today, Chinese hinterlands are not yet 
accessible to foreign freight forwarders, except for OOCL, the Hong Kong company, for 
ideological, historical and cultural reasons.  
Despite the economic reforms, North Korean exports still face the Japanese and U.S. 
embargoes. Because the Peace Treaty is not yet signed by the U.S., accessing the Gaeseong 
Industrial Park either through the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) or from Pyongyang faces 
several constraints, such as military control and unstable diplomatic relationships between the 
two Koreas. Thus, the improvement of logistics in North Korea, despite the new economic 
environment provided by the reforms, is hampered by a contradiction between closure and 
openness. This contradiction delays the possible effects of economic reforms on the transport 
system itself, such as infrastructure modernisation and free circulation. Still in North Korea, 
transport issues seem to be a restrictive factor for development, and it will take time until the 
country gains better recognition from the global community for its efforts towards openness, 
its comparative advantages for labour and industries, and its strategic location within 
Northeast Asia.  
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Table 1: Main trading partners of North Korea, 2001-2005 (Unit: millions US$) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Trade Share Trade Share Trade Share Trade Share Trade Share 
China 737 27.6 738 25.4 1022 32.8 1385 39.0 1580 39.0 
South Korea 403 15.1 641 22.1 724 23.2 697 19.6 1044 25.8 
Thailand 130 4.9 216 7.5 254 8.2 329 9.3 329 8.1 
Japan 474 17.8 369 12.7 265 8.5 252 7.1 194 4.7 
Russia 68 2.6 80 2.8 118 3.8 213 6.0 232 5.7 
India 157 5.9 191 6.6 158 5.1 135 3.8 N/A N/A 
Singapore N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 56 1.5 80 1.9 
EU countries N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 261 7.3 292 7.2 
Others 702 26.3 633 22.9 572 18.4 226 6.3 294 7.2 
Total 2673 100.0 2902 100.0 3115 100.0 3554 100.0 4045 100.0 
Sources: Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
Table 2: Trade between North and South Korea, 1998-2006 (unit: 000s US$) 
 1998 % 1999 % 2000 % 2001 % 2002 % 2003 % 2004 % 2005 % 2006 % 
TOTAL TRADE 1693000 100.00 1790000 100.00 2395000 100.00 2619000 100.00 2839000 100.00 3018000 100.00 3547000 100.00 4044000 100.00   
INTER-KOREAN TRADE 251158 14.83 310024 17.32 425686 17.77 349172 13.33 579476 20.41 627488 20.79 687874 19.39 1044431 25.82 129590  
                   
IMPORTS FROM NORTH 123357 49.12 113697 36.67 152912 35.92 155988 44.67 249051 42.98 245464 39.12 257946 37.50 340916 32.64 55159 42.56  
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 29319 23.77 43903 38.61 72108 47.16 74602 47.83 92634 37.19 103696 42.25 98992 38.38 112242 32.92 16975 30.78 
Chemical products 2260 1.83 1992 1.75 1162 0.76 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Electric and electronic products 3596 2.92 2726 1.88 402 5.40 0 4.50 0 3.03 0 0.00 0 0.00 22500 3.61 4272 5.16 
Iron, steel and other metals 22624 18.34 14982 13.18 11697 7.65 8786 5.63 14875 5.97 20941 8.53 39702 15.39 47784 14.02 6206 11.25 
Machinery and transport equipment 651 0.53 815 0.72 1467 0.96 1704 1.09 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Mineral and mine products 482 0.39 2141 2.40 8264 0.26 7011 0.00 7541 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 12306 6.60 2846 7.75 
Textile products 54129 43.88 43183 37.98 53957 35.29 52886 33.90 75575 30.35 87656 35.71 99233 38.47 122034 35.80 19643 35.61 
Other 6035 4.89 2108 1.85 3759 2.46 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
                   
Commercial imports       103392 66.28 248360 99.72 241349 98.32 257818 99.95 344712 99.92 55159 100.00 
Processing trade       48286 46.70 91697 36.92 99672 41.30 115152 40.84 194029 56.91 21769 39.47 
Commercial transactions       42198 40.81 156663 63.08 145877 60.44 142666 59.11 29637 8.69 6549 11.87 
General trade       0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 132855 38.97 26841 48.66 
Non-commercial imports       12239 7.85 978 0.39 4115 1.68 128 0.05 279 0.08 0 0.00 
Mount Geumgang       2168 99.96 160 16.36 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Cooperation projects       5 0.04 816 83.44 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
LWR project       0 0 1 0.10 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
                   
EXPORTS TO NORTH 127801 50.88 196327 63.33 272774 64.08 193184 55.33 330425 57.02 382024 60.88 429928 62.50 703515 67.36 74431 57.43  
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 2962 2.32 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 97944 29.64 114220 29.90 56774 13.21 110313 15.68 5200 6.99 
Chemical products 4251 3.33 42586 21.69 95526 35.02 59336 30.71 75222 22.77 76577 20.05 128461 29.88 224891 31.97 11963 16.07 
Electric and electronic products 4235 3.31 5359 2.49 28101 10.30 10035 5.20 20480 6.20 19523 5.11 29392 6.84 27134 3.86 8631 11.60 
Household products 2639 2.06 3289 1.68 4910 1.80 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Iron, steel and other metals 8780 6.87 15732 8.01 13998 5.13 10376 5.37 25008 7.57 22810 5.97 14290 3.32 21468 3.05 5443 7.31 
Machinery and transport equipment 29019 22.71 25253 12.86 32128 11.78 21198 10.97 36761 11.13 23897 6.26 43678 10.16 104737 14.89 12775 17.16 
Non-metallic mineral products 21346 16.70 43820 22.32 20202 7.41 7036 3.64 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 24312 3.46 4644 6.24 
Plastic, rubber and leather products 3437 2.69 4894 2.73 5031 1.84 279 0.14 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Primary products 14956 11.70 15744 8.02 25901 9.50 20967 10.85 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Textile 27068 21.18 34448 17.55 43423 15.92 41777 21.63 59256 17.93 76890 20.13 85877 19.97 84453 12.00 11346 15.24 
Others 1646 1.29 3053 1.56 3565 1.31 1697 0.88 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
                   
Humanitarian assistance 31850 24.92 46880 23.88 113760 41.70 135390 70.08 138820 42.01 177950 46.58 256200 59.59 212540 30.21 16670 22.39 
NGOs 20850 65.46 18630 39.74 35130 30.88 64940 47.97 51170 36.86 70610 39.68 141080 55.07 88660 41.71 14320 85.90 
Korea National Red Cross (%) 20850 100.00 13065 70.13 9416 26.80 22000 33.88 6923 13.53 5860 8.30 37000 26.23     
NGOs (%) 0 0.00 5565 29.87 25174 73.20 42940 66.12 44247 86.47 64750 91.70 104080 73.77     
Government 11000 34.54 28250 60.26 78630 69.12 70450 52.03 87650 63.14 107340 60.32 115120 44.93 123880 58.29 2350 14.10 
Bilateral 0 0.00 28250 100.00 78630 100.00 65770 93.36 69670 79.49 89250 83.15 300 0.26     
World Food Programme (WFP) 11000 100.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 100 0.14 17390 19.84 16190 15.08 24000 20.85     
World Health Organization (WHO) 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 460 0.65 590 0.67 660 0.61 870 0.76     
WMO 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00     
UNICEF 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 500 0.47 1000 0.87     
FAO 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00     
Other 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 4120 5.85 0 0.00 740 0.69 88950 77.27     
                   
Non Commercial Exports 54703 42.80 48675 24.79 170396 62.47 51446 26.63 267600 80.99 252017 65.97 339809 79.04     
Cooperation project 900 1.65 0 0.00 0 0.00 5889 11.45 10363 3.87 1218 0.48 47922 14.10     
LWR project 1800 3.29 6761 13.89 35609 20.90 16701 32.46 55260 20.65 20307 8.06 448 0.13     
KEDO heavy oil 12830 23.45 20059 41.21 0 0.00 2878 5.59 2041 0.76 0 0.00 0 0.00     
Material aid 15052 27.52 2906 5.97 104478 61.31 20128 39.12 188995 70.63 217317 86.23 250076 73.59     
Mount Geumgang 24121 44.09 18810 38.64 14606 8.57 4438 8.63 10941 4.09 13175 5.23 41363 12.17     
Other joint ventures 0 0.00 139 0.29 6943 4.07 1412 2.74 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00     
Other 0 0.00 0 0.00 8760 5.14 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00     
                   
Commercial Exports 0 0.00 44754 22.80 99111 36.33 39325 20.36 62725 18.98 109979 28.79 90123 20.96     
Business-based transactions 0 0.00 12414 27.74 36499 36.83 10025 25.49 4193 6.68 45932 41.76 25641 28.45     
Processing on commission 0 0.00 32340 72.26 62612 63.17 29300 74.51 58532 93.32 64047 58.24 64482 71.55     
                   
PROCESSING TRADE       103465 29.63 150222 25.92 163519 26.06 175506 25.51 207837 19.9 40525 31.27 
                   
Imports from North       62166 100.00 91690 100.00 99472 100.00 107674 100.00     
Agriculture, forestry and fishing       2107 3.39 1669 1.82 0 0.00 0 0.00     
Textile       47219 75.96 75244 82.06 87252 87.72 92679 86.07     
Electric and electronic products       7124 11.46 7233 7.89 6373 6.41 7979 7.41     
Chemical products       546 0.88 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00     
Machinery and transport equipment       0 0.00 1790 1.95 0 0.00 0 0.00     
Household products       0 0.00 739 0.81 0 0.00 0 0.00     
Others       3863 6.21 909 0.99 0 0.00 0 0.00     
                   
Exports to North       41299 100.00 58532 100.00 64047 100.00 67832 100.00     
Primary products       1161 2.81 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00     
Textile       26903 65.14 41889 71.57 50836 79.37 55020 81.11     
Electric and electronic products       7006 16.96 7120 12.17 6875 10.73 6925 10.21     
Machinery and transport equipment       2711 6.57 80 0.14 0 0.00 0 0.00     
Plastic, rubber and leather products       675 1.64 1134 1.94 0 0.00 0 0.00     
Iron and other metals       232 0.56 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00     
Household products       0 0.00 1495 2.55 1927 3.01 222 0.33     
Agriculture, forestry and fishing       0 0.00 972 1.66 0 0.00 0 0.00     
Others       70 0.17 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00     
Source: Ministry of Unification in South Korea 
(a) The year 2006 comprises only February and March 
(b) 1999 and 2001 lack of data for the type of exports.  
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Table 3: Basic territorial characteristics of North Korea and neighbouring countries, 1995-2005 
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DPRK 120,410 2,495 2,250 
1995 23,486 920 49 37 30 6.2 4 69.1 87 1,149 
2005 22,912 1,800 78 154 31 6.4 5 67.1 238 1,389 
ROK 98,190 2,413 1,608 
1995 45,553 11,270 114 455 63 72.4 3 7.7 412 9,985 
2005 48,422 20,300 179 2,260 97 76.5 6 38.6 601 11,081 
RUSSIA 16,995,800 37,653 72,000 
1995 149,909 4,820 2,517 203,000 934 22.3 87 24.6 800 10,128 
2005 143,420 10,700 640 239,439 537 32.5 154 46.2 1,194 5,505 
JAPAN 377,835 29,751 1,770 
1995 125,506 20,200 175 2,006 1,111 67.8 23 40.4 851 27,292 
2005 127,417 30,400 174 2,949 1,177 77.7 27 70.0 702 12,680 
CHINA 9,326,410 14,500 121,557 
1995 1,203,097 2,500 204 17,000 1,029 16.5 65 10.9 1,628 24,027 
2005 1,306,313 6,200 472 33,648 1,809 79.9 71 25.1 1,649 27,749 
Source: CIA, The World Factbook, 1995 & 2005 
 
Table 4: Time and distance from Pyongyang to main cities 
Pyongyang to: Distance (km) 
Travel time by truck (hours) 
2000 2005 
Nampo 60 N/A 1 
Sariwon 70 N/A 2 
Haeju 120 N/A 3 
Gaeseong 160 N/A 8 
Sinuiju 230 5 7 
Wonsan 230 2.5 7 
Hamheung 430 5.5 48 
Kanggyae 500 20 Out of reach 
Cheongjin 960 15 Out of reach 
Hyesan 1260 22 Out of reach 
Raseon 1400 25 Out of reach 
Sources: World Food Programme, 2003; Korea Strategic Data, 2006 
 
Table 5: Infrastructure characteristics of North Korean ports 
 
Stevedoring 
capacity (tons) 
Maximum 
Quay length (m) 
Minimum 
Quay length (m) 
Maximum 
Depth (m) 
Minimum 
Depth (m) 
Berth capacity 
(tons) 
Cheongjin 800 5,270 2,138 10 8.5 20,000 
Haeju 240 1,350 1,305 12 7 10,000 
Heungnam 400 2,061 1,630 13 6.7 20,000 
Nampo 750 2,510 1,694 13.5 10 25,000 
Rajin 300 4,340 2,280 11 10 15,000 
Seonbong 200 2,515 456 23 7 5,000 
Songrim 100 700 400 11 10 15,000 
Wonsan 169 2,970 470 12.8 6.1 10,000 
Sources: Asia Trade Hub, 2005; Lloyd‟s Ports of the World 2005; Portguide 2006 
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Table 6: Traditional functions of North Korean port cities 
Port city Main port functions Main urban functions Hinterland (natural resources) 
Cheongjin 
Coals 
Containers 
General cargo 
Grains 
Steel 
Chemicals 
Equipollent industry 
Locomotive plant 
Machinery 
Rubber factory 
Steel and fiber industry center 
Shipyard 
Coal field 
Cobalt 
Nickel 
Haeju 
Cement 
Ore 
Zinc concentrates 
Agriculture (granary area) 
Cement factory 
Chemical products 
Marine products 
Shipbuilding & repair 
Steel 
Graphite 
Heungnam 
(Hamheung) 
Fertilizers 
Magnesia clinker 
Chemical & fertilizer industrial complex 
Machines 
Textiles 
Wood chip processing 
Tungsten 
Zinc 
Nampo 
Cements 
Coals 
Sundries  
Chemicals 
Electronics 
Nampo Glass Corporation 
Nampo Fishery Complex 
Nampo Smelter Complex 
Pyonghwa Automobiles 
Shipbuilding & repair industry center 
Coal 
Iron ore 
Zinc 
Rajin 
(Raseon) 
Coals 
Crude oil 
Fertilizers 
Petrochemical products 
Timber 
Sundries 
Construction 
Electric power plant 
Oil-fired power plant and oil refinery 
Real estate 
Retailing 
Seafood & food processing 
Tourism 
Transport 
Uranium mine 
Coal field 
Songjin 
(Kimchaek) 
- Steel mill 
Coal 
Copper 
Graphite 
Iron ore 
Lead 
Magnesite 
Songrim 
(Pyongyang) 
Coals 
Iron ore 
Oil 
Hwanghae Steel Mill 
Gold 
Silver 
Wonsan 
Cement 
Marine products 
Aquatic product processing plant 
Cement factory 
Chemistry enterprise 
Fish & rice processing 
Leather goods 
Machines 
Manufacture of locomotives 
Shipyard 
Textiles 
- 
Source: compiled from various sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
Table 7: Specialisation of North Korean ports (Unit: 000s & %DWT) 
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DWT % DWT % DWT % DWT % DWT % DWT % DWT % DWT % DWT % DWT % DWT % DWT % DWT % DWT % 
Cheongjin 
85-91 892.9 13.6 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.7 54.4 26.5 0.0 0.0 3384.0 22.5 2.1 0.2 34.0 3.1 199.5 15.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 7.2 13.8 14.3 15.4 27.1 0.0 0.0 
92-99 932.3 14.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.2 9.9 1.5 9.1 1331.2 15.7 76.6 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.7 7.1 49.9 39.4 15.8 8.6 24.8 40.7 0.0 0.0 
00-06 505.0 9.9 4.1 6.7 44.4 28.3 32.1 39.0 1.7 3.6 892.3 13.5 26.2 1.4 8.8 100.0 256.3 32.5 6.4 6.5 3.9 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Haeju 
85-91 29.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 201.5 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
92-99 22.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 16.9 413.9 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.5 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.1 48.3 
00-06 37.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 19.3 499.9 7.5 286.2 14.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.0 16.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Heungnam 
85-91 1371.5 20.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.8 24.8 11.2 81.3 2850.0 19.0 60.6 4.9 34.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.7 10.1 0.0 0.0 2.2 3.8 0.0 0.0 
92-99 602.0 9.3 8.2 18.2 4.6 3.5 21.4 11.6 1.5 9.1 592.1 7.0 102.7 6.9 0.0 0.0 96.0 39.5 2.0 1.3 14.6 11.6 14.8 8.1 4.2 6.8 23.6 25.9 
00-06 425.1 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 3.2 539.3 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.4 4.9 0.0 0.0 11.1 7.4 48.6 26.5 42.6 45.9 401.6 94.4 
Nampo 
85-91 2814.4 42.9 219.7 100.0 53.4 23.0 39.0 19.0 0.4 3.2 4202.8 28.0 19.4 1.6 864.9 78.2 140.0 10.5 1.3 100.0 31.0 26.7 47.9 49.6 39.2 69.1 0.0 0.0 
92-99 3365.9 52.0 36.8 81.8 26.0 19.6 103.4 56.0 0.0 0.0 3818.1 45.1 418.5 28.2 154.7 80.6 25.6 10.5 0.0 0.0 24.1 19.0 0.0 0.0 19.1 31.3 23.6 25.9 
00-06 2743.7 53.9 45.0 73.3 5.1 3.3 25.3 30.7 6.2 12.9 3443.4 52.0 434.0 22.5 0.0 0.0 179.0 22.7 0.0 0.0 12.6 8.5 15.1 8.2 21.4 23.1 0.0 0.0 
Rajin 
85-91 84.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 3.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 703.3 4.7 3.0 0.2 68.1 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.7 35.1 11.4 11.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
92-99 449.1 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.5 6.2 0.0 0.0 378.9 4.5 1.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.0 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
00-06 33.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 5.8 0.3 0.7 232.0 3.5 1.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 65.8 44.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.6 5.6 
Songjin 
85-91 77.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
92-99 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.9 0.3 12.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.2 14.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
00-06 54.5 1.1 8.2 13.3 12.2 7.8 8.1 9.9 0.0 0.0 201.1 3.0 94.8 4.9 0.0 0.0 91.0 11.5 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Songrim 
85-91 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
92-99 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.9 21.2 0.0 0.0 
00-06 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.1 12.1 0.2 8.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 30.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.5 5.7 28.7 31.0 0.0 0.0 
Wonsan 
85-91 592.6 9.0 0.0 0.0 164.4 70.7 20.1 9.8 1.8 13.3 2043.6 13.6 1119.7 90.4 8.7 0.8 985.8 74.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
92-99 68.2 1.1 0.0 0.0 49.7 37.6 0.0 0.0 9.3 56.1 897.7 10.6 352.2 23.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 137.2 91.5 0.4 0.3 135.9 74.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
00-06 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.8 14.6 0.0 0.0 25.8 54.1 343.8 5.2 106.2 5.5 0.0 0.0 4.9 0.6 90.6 92.4 11.4 7.7 90.6 49.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit 
* percentages refer to the share of traffics in North Korea’s total 
 
Table 8: Growth rates of bulk and general cargo traffics at North Korean ports (Unit: %) 
Port city Bulk General cargo 
 
(85-91) / 
(92-99) 
(92-99) / 
(00-06) 
(85-91) / 
(00-06) 
(85-91) / 
(92-99) 
(92-99) / 
(00-06) 
(85-91) / 
(00-06) 
Cheongjin +4.4 -45.8 -43.4 -60.7 -33.0 -73.6 
Haeju -24.9 +68.0 +26.2 +105.4 +20.8 +148.1 
Heungnam -56.1 -29.4 -69.0 -79.2 -8.9 -81.1 
Nampo +19.6 -18.5 -2.5 -9.2 -9.8 -18.1 
Rajin +432.7 -92.5 -60.1 -46.1 -38.8 -67.0 
Songjin -100.0  -29.2 +137.6 +776.9 +1983.4 
Songrim     -25.9  
Wonsan -88.5 -100.0 -100.0 -56.1 -61.7 -83.2 
Total -1.5 -21.3 -22.5 -43.7 -21.7 -55.9 
Source: Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit 
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Figure 1: Evolution of regional and urban population in North Korea 
 
Sources: Jo & Adler, 2002; World Gazeetter, 2006 
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Figure 2: Current development projects in North Korea 
 
Source: compiled from various sources 
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Figure 3: Evolution of total North Korean trade and shipping capacity, 1985-2005 
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Sources: Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit; Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency 
 
Figure 4: Estimated share of sea transport in North Korean trade, 1985-2005 (Unit: %$US) 
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 Sources: Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit; Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency 
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Figure 5: Evolution of the North Korean port system, 1985-2006 (Unit: %DWT) 
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 Source: Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit 
(a) Figures for 2006 are available until August 
(b) Percentages refer to the share of weighted tons 
(c) Dark colours are above the average of the row 
